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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OP UTAH 
GAIL KATHLEEN THROCKMORTON, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
CECIL DEE THROCKMORTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 87Q4QQ-CA 
Cate'gory 14 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSOES 
On this appeal defendant/appellant Cecil Dee 
Throckmorton raised the following issues: 
1. Did the plaintiff meet her burden in establishing 
a substantial and permanent change in circumstances sufficient 
to justify the trial court's modification of the Divorce 
Decree? 
2. Did the trial court adequately consider the Paffel 
criteria prior to awarding plaintiff alimony? 
On cross appeal the plaintiff/respondent Gail Kathleen 
Throckmorton raised the following issues: 
1. Is plaintiff's claim against defendant's 
retirement account barred by the doctrine of res judicata? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
failing to award plaintiff any interest in defendant's 
retirement account ? 
Defendant/Appellant raises the following additional 
issue: 
Is plaintiff's claim against defendant's retirement 
account barred by the relevant statute of limitations? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the statement of facts contained in 
Respondent's Brief, Appellant submits the following facts: 
1. Plaintiff/Respondent was aware of the existence of 
defendant's retirement plan at the time of the divorce in 1976 
and failed to assert a claim against it at that time and again 
failed to assert a claim against it in 1980^  wh e n this decree 
was modified. (TR p.35f lines 1-4) 
2. At the time the parties were divorced defendant's 
interest in the retirement plan amounted to $9673. (TR p.17, 
lines 13-14) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT 
ACCOUNT IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF KNEW OF THE RETIREMENT ACCOUNT AT THE TIME OF THE 
DIVORCE AND ALSO IN 1980 WHEN THE DECREE WAS MODIFIED AND 
FAILED TO ASSERT A CLAIM AS THOSE TIMES. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized _ that 
res judicata applies to divorce actions. Jacobsen v. 
Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985); Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978). 
-2-
As the Court in Jacobsen stated: 
When there has been an adjudication, it becomes 
res judicata as to those issues which were 
either tried and determined, or upon all issues 
which the party had a fair opportunity to 
present and have determined in the other 
proceeding, 
Jacobsen at 305 (quoting Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 
P.2d 1287, 1289 (1980)). 
In the case at hand the court found the plaintiff knew 
of the existence of defendant's retirement account at the time 
of the divorce in 1976. Plaintiff failed to assert any claim 
on the benefits at that time. 
The court's finding is supported by testimony of both 
parties. At the divorce hearing plaintiff testified that she 
knew of the retirement benefits at the time of the divorce in 
1976. (TR p.35, lines 1-4, Direct examination of plaintiff) 
Q Did you ever have any information in 
regard to the fact that he (defendant) had 
a retirement? 
A Yes. I knew he had a retirement. I did 
not know that I was legally entitled to 
any portion of that. 
Plaintiff therefore knew of the retirement in 1976 and 
ad a fair opportunity to litigate the issue at that time. 
ndeed plaintiff was the party represented by counsel. 
efendant signed a consent to default. Therefore, the trial 
ourt correctly ruled that the issue should have been raised 
t the time the original divorce decree was entered into and 
Laintiff is now barred by res judicata from asserting a claim 
} defendant's benefits. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFFfS CLAIM TO DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
IS BARRED BY S78-12-25 U.C.A. AND THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
Section 78-12-25 provides that an action for relief 
not otherwise provided by law shall be brought within four 
years. As the court ruling indicates plaintiff was aware of 
the retirement plan at the time of divorce in 1976. 
Plaintiff's claim is now barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
Moreover, plaintiff's claims are barred by laches. 
The Supreme Court held that laches essentially contains two 
elements: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of the 
plaintiff; and (2) an injury to defendant due to the lack of 
diligence. Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980). 
In this case the court clearly held that plaintiff was 
aware of the retirement in 1976 and waited ten years to assert 
a claim against it. At the time of the divorce in 1976, when 
plaintiff should have asserted her claim, defendant's total 
interest in the retirement plan was $9673. Pursuant to the 
Divorce Decree, plaintiff obtained the equity in the parties 
home of $24,000 which was realized by plaintiff through the 
sale of the home in 1983. The defendant received his 
retirement and was ordered to pay and assume $12,000 in debts 
of the marriage. Plaintiff now wishes to relitigate the 
"bargain" but has nothing to offer in return. If plaintiff 
had asserted a right to the $9673 retirement account in 1976, 
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the debts may have been more evenly distributed, or the 
parties may have split the equity in the home. In sum it is 
now inequitable to relitigate the property distribution ten 
years later after plaintiff has received and spent the 
benefits of the agreement. Plaintiff's delay has prejudiced 
defendant and is therefore barred. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD LACKS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
PLAINTIFFfS HEALTH PROBLEMS AND THERE IS NO EXPERT TESTIMONY 
OR OTHER SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THESE PROBLEMS PERMANENTLY 
DISABLE PLAINTIFF AND PREVENT HER FROM WORKING AT ANY 
EMPLOYMENT WHATSOEVER. 
Plaintiff argues that the material change in 
circumstances is due to health problems that prevent her from 
obtaining employment. It is the plaintiff's burden of proof 
to prove that these problems: (1) existf (2) are permanent 
and (3) essentially render her unemployable. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the record is 
devoid of such proof. Although the plaintiff is competent to 
testify regarding her perception of her problems, she is not 
an expert as to their permanance or to what extent her 
problems render her permanently disabled. In fact, the record 
indicates that plaintiff's problems can be corrected by 
surgery. (TR p.6, lines 19-22) 
This Court faced a similar finding of fact in Rusham 
r. Rusham, 65 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 31 (Utah App. 1987) where the 
:ourt held that a finding that plaintiff had heart problems 
'as unsupported by the evidence. Id. at 31. 
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As in Rusham, the trial court did not have sufficient 
evidence to support its finding that plaintiff's health 
problems render her permanently disabled and unemployable. 
Plaintiff should be required to present expert testimony as to 
her problems prior to a finding of permanent disability. 
Because plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof defendant 
respectfully requests that the award of alimony be reversed 
and plaintiff's petition to modify be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, defendant respectfully requests 
that the decision of the trial court regarding alimony be 
reversed and that the court's ruling regarding defendant's 
retirement be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of March, 1988. 
MCRAE & DeLAND 
*ttM<<& HARRY E/ SOUVALL 
Attoaa^y for Appellant 
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